Exceptional Boards: Environmental Experience and Positive Deviance from Institutional Norms by Hoffman, Andrew J.







Exceptional Boards: Environmental Experience and 
Positive Deviance from Institutional Norms 
 
 
Judith L. Walls 
Nanyang Business School  
Nanyang Technological University 
 
Andrew J. Hoffman 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  












Ross School of Business Working Paper 
Working Paper No. 1348 
March 2012 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 34 (2) 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Sciences Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2940269 
 1 
EXCEPTIONAL BOARDS: ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE AND POSITIVE 
DEVIANCE FROM INSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
 
 
Judith L. Walls 
Concordia University 
1455 de Maisonneuve Bldv. W 
Montréal, QC H3G 1M8 
CANADA 
jwalls@jmsb.concordia.ca 




Andrew J. Hoffman 
University of Michigan 
701 Tappan Street 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
USA 
ajhoff@umich.edu 




Published as: Walls, J. and A. Hoffman (2012) “Exceptional boards: Environmental 
experience and positive deviance from institutional norms,” Journal of Organizational 





The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Alcoa Foundation 
Conservation and Sustainability Fellowship Program and the Frederick A. and Barbara M. 
Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. We also 
like to thank participants at several research seminars and conferences for helpful 
comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
 2 
EXCEPTIONAL BOARDS: ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE AND POSITIVE 




This paper explores the phenomenon of positive organizational deviance from 
institutional norms by establishing practices that protect or enhance the natural 
environment. Seeking to explain why some organizations practice positive environmental 
deviance while others do not, we locate our inquiry on the board of directors - the 
organizational body that interprets external issues and guides organizational response. 
We find a strong correlation between positive deviance and the past environmental 
experience of board directors and the centrality of the organization within field-level 
networks. Organizations located on the periphery of the network and whose board 
possess a high level of environmental experience are more likely to deviate in positive 
ways. Our conclusions contribute to multiple literatures in behavioral and environmental 
governance, the role of filtering and enaction in the process of institutional conformity 





Since the 1960s, organizations have found themselves under increasing 
institutional pressure to attend to environmental sustainability as part of their corporate 
agenda (Hoffman, 2001a). Many organizations respond to these pressures by adhering to 
accepted and legitimated environmental standards. But some proactively adopt 
environmental practices that go beyond those regulative and normative expectations to 
offer broad social benefits (Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Hart, 1995). This type of positive 
organizational deviance – the intentional departure from institutional norms (Baron, 
2006; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004) – is particularly compelling as an area of study. 
Because environmental issues are complex and have unclear solutions, external 
contextual factors tend to lead to conformity of organizational action (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004; March & Olsen, 1976) rather than positive organizational deviance. Something 
internal to the firm, rather than institutional context, must therefore determine differences 
in organizational response. This paper seeks to explain this phenomenon. 
Institutional expectations for engagement on issues such as environmental 
sustainability come from sources of coercive, normative and cognitive influence that 
originate within organizational fields, whose constituencies include the government, 
shareholders, value chain members, trade associations, public opinion, and others 
(Hoffman, 2001b; McDonough, Ventresca & Outcalt, 2000; Scott, 1995). While this 
pressure impacts organizations in multiple ways, and through multiple channels (Aldrich 
& Herker, 1977; Tushman & Scanlon, 1981), our paper locates its inquiry into the 
sources of positive deviance at the level of corporate environmental governance.  
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We take a behavioral governance approach (Hambrick, v. Werder & Zajac, 2008) 
to examine how the board of directors’ experience and networks help shape an 
organization’s response to institutional pressures. Increasingly, boards are mandated to 
attend to their fiduciary responsibilities and engage with stakeholders to mediate 
conflicting interests (Blesener, et al, 2009; Lan & Heracleous, 2010; White, 2006). This 
includes addressing issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability, by 
adhering to programmatic standards such as the UN Global Compact (Escudero et al, 
2009; Mackenzie & Hodgsons, 2005; Tonello, 2010). Roughly 60% of public companies 
have set up dedicated board committees to oversee issues related to sustainability (Hall & 
Cruse, 2011). And yet, despite the normative development of such boards, we still 
observe a variance in the extent to which these companies adopt baseline environmental 
practices or deviate positively. 
We propose that the variance in organizational actions towards environmental 
sustainability depends, in large part, on the direction given by the board of directors. The 
ways in which this organizational body recognizes, frames, and interprets environmental 
issues influences how the organization acts on them (Dutton & Duckerich, 1991; 
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002; Scott, 1995). The board 
interprets the institutional pressures based on the skills and experience of its members 
and shapes an organizational response by providing strategic direction based on that 
interpretation (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Yet, such 
actions do not take place in a vacuum. Organizational environmental response also 
depends on the strength of pressures to conform to institutional norms and the 
corresponding need to gain legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). We propose that these 
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two forces and their interaction explain why some organizations practice positive 
deviance in the context of environmental practices and others do not. 
In examining this phenomenon, our work contributes to several streams of 
literature. First, we contribute to an emerging stream of work on behavioral governance 
by considering the roles of board experience and networks as mechanisms of governance 
that go beyond traditional agency theory considerations (Hambrick et al, 2008). In doing 
so, we capture the complexity of governance in real-world organizations (Lubatkin, 
2007) by applying a behavioral lens of governance for sustainability-oriented outcomes. 
A second contribution of our work is to the developing area of environmental governance 
that has uncovered a need to understand the complex role boards play for environmental 
and social outcomes of firms that may conflict with corporate financial goals and agency 
theory predictions (Walls, Berrone & Phan, 2012). Third, we provide insight into the 
underlying mechanisms of institutional change by recognizing the role of cognitive and 
contextual influences in the interpretation of institutional pressures and their subsequent 
implications for organizational agency (or deviance) – mechanisms that have not been 
extensively studied (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Milstein, Hart & York, 2002). Finally, 
we offer new perspectives on how organizations become “more sustainable” and engage 
in proactive environmental practices, areas open to research in both the positive 
organizational scholarship (Hoffman, Badiane & Haigh, 2011) and environmental 
management literatures (Ehrenfeld, 2008; Hart, 1995).  
 
POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL DEVIANCE WITHIN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
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Positive organizational deviance is notably relevant in the context of 
environmental sustainability. When organizations mitigate the impact of their activities 
on the natural environment through their products, processes and policies (Bansal & Roth, 
2000) in ways that go beyond what is required by regulation, they are practicing positive 
organizational deviance that has benefits that accrue to society and not just to the 
organization (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Walls, Phan & Berrone, 2011). 
Within the sustainability literature, this kind of deviance is critical for the establishment 
of innovative practices that lead to the broad scale institutional change necessary to 
achieve corporate sustainability.  
The institutional literature has sought to explain these institutional change 
processes more fully by devoting increased attention to active agency within 
organizational fields (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1998; DiMaggio, 1988; Hoffman & 
Ventresca, 2002). Rather than a more traditional focus on isomorphism, more recent 
institutional analysis has paid greater attention to the ability of individual organizations to 
respond in a variety of ways to institutional demands (Oliver, 1991), or even influence 
change at the level of the institutional field (Lawrence, 1999).  
At the most fundamental level, the institutional context limits the extent to which 
decision-makers within organizations rationalize their actions by creating cognitive 
constraints and boundaries on their interaction with the larger environment (Jennings & 
Greenwood, 2003; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, 1995). For 
instance, the organization’s network or ties to other organizations determines how 
particular practices and related information are diffused (Brass et al, 2004). Such inter-
organizational network ties are particularly effective at pressuring firms towards social 
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cohesiveness and conformity of action (Burt, 1987; Fligstein, 1985; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997).  
But the fact remains that not all organizations accede to institutional demands. To 
account for such deviance, neo-institutionalism acknowledges organizational actions that 
depart from social norms in specific and directed ways (Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991). 
However, identifying specific factors that lead to this outcome have not been extensively 
studied (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; see Johnson, Smith & Codling, 2000; Bansal & 
Penner, 2002 for exceptions). In this paper, we explore the ways in which agency and 
enactment (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005) play a role in organizational deviance 
within institutional contexts (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) through internal, behavioral 
aspects of the organization. 
Agency and enactment take place when organizational decision-makers interpret, 
construct and enact the organization’s external institutional context (George et al, 2006; 
Karnoe, 1997; Zilber, 2002) by paying selective attention to particular issues (Dutton & 
Duckerich, 1991; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), interpreting them and then constructing a 
legitimate repertoire of possible responses (Daft & Weick, 1984; Kauer, 2008; Maitlis, 
2005). All of these actions are influenced by the filters of the decision-makers’ prior 
experience, context and social interactions (Snook, 2000). This interpretation for 
enactment takes place within many boundary spanning functions within the organization 
(e.g. the senior management team, stakeholder engagement functions, or operational 
management) that are in contact with and receptive to specific constituencies and norms 
within the organizational field (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Tushman & Scanlon, 1981). 
Each function occupies a specific location within the organization and is tasked with 
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different roles and power. However, one function that is particularly significant for 
understanding the connection of the organizational field to the firm’s internal governance 
is the board of directors.  
 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL DEVIANCE 
The board of directors is a key governance function that links the organization to 
its institutional context. Boards transcend and span organizational boundaries by 
providing access to external resources, information and demands (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Johnson, Daily & Elstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Boards also maintain the 
ultimate level of control over organizational actions by setting the limits within which 
managers may act (Mizruchi, 1983) and often influence corporate strategic directions 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). When the board allocates time and 
attention to issues, they are prioritizing those issues in the organizational agenda (Dutton 
& Jackson, 1987; Ocasio, 1997).  
In the past, many have argued that the board’s role has been passive, merely 
functioning as a “rubber-stamp” (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983). But recent corporate 
governance scandals and initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have focused 
attention on boards and forced their increasingly active roles. This is especially 
noticeable in the case of corporate social and sustainability goals, where board directors 
can be held personally liable for failing to adhere to environmental regulation (Schultz, 
2001) or subject to shareholder lawsuits for failing to recognize material implications of 
organizational environmental actions. Moreover, many voluntary initiatives have 
encouraged companies to adopt environmental, social and governance structures and 
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performance measures as an integral part of their strategy, with corresponding oversight 
by the board of directors (Blesener et al., 2009; Escudero et al., 2010; Mackenzie & 
Hodgson, 2005; Tonello, 2010; White, 2006). 
The board’s involvement in decisions on sustainability is fitting because 
monitoring and attention of boards is particularly salient when practices require 
significant capital investments and have uncertain outcomes (e.g. Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Ledgerwood, 1997). These characteristics can be emblematic of environmental issues, 
which are often institutionally complex (Hoffman, 2001b), have long-term implications 
(Roome, 1992), require substantial investment (UNPRI, 2010), and can be inherently 
risky (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; McKendall, Sánchez & Sicilian, 1999). In fashioning a 
strategic response, firms need to extend beyond organizational boundaries to acquire 
necessary resources and gain social legitimacy (Walls, Phan & Berrone, 2011). Since 
organizations tend to model or even imitate their environmental response after those of 
other organizations (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), however, exceptional deviant responses 
must rest on particular aspects of the organization’s board.  
From a behavioral perspective (Hambrick et al, 2008), two aspects of the board of 
directors are relevant in determining how organizations react to institutional pressure: 
structural elements and intra-organizational factors (Greenwood et al, 2008). Structural 
elements acknowledge the extent to which organizations exist within a larger context via 
interlocking directorship or network ties. Intra-organizational factors recognize the 
influence of experience and skills of board members in filtering information retrieval and 
interpretation. Together, the presence and interaction of these two factors determines the 
extent to which an organization will conform or deviate positively in its action from peers 
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in the institutional field. In the following section, we develop hypotheses to elaborate and 
specify these influences.  
 
Structural Elements: Board Networks 
Networks are essential components of organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004) creating connectedness and common sets of linkages 
(structural equivalence) between organizations (Laumann, Galaskiewicz & Marsden, 
1978; White, Boorman & Breiger, 1976). Interlocking directorships create networks that 
tie organizations together, functioning as a key channel to collect information (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Salman & Saives, 2005) and disperse organizational practices 
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). Hence, these board networks act as prisms through 
which members of a firm interpret the institutional logics of the field they occupy (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2008).  
For example, board networks allow organizations to gain access to strategic 
advice, counsel and expertise (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001; Westphal, 1999), create linkages to important stakeholders (Burt, 1980), and 
safeguard their reputation and legitimacy (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In this manner, networks create a shared social environment (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993) where organizations convey the value of certain practices to others in the 
network (Hillman, Shropshire & Canella, 2007) regardless of whether the practices 
enhance or diminish social or environmental welfare (Kang, 2008; Pfarrer et al, 2008).  
Networks, essentially, function as lubricants of normative organizational behavior 
that encourage those within the institutional field to imitate each other’s processes and 
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practices (Westphal, et al, 1997; Westphal, Seidel & Stewart, 2001). Organizations are 
inclined to adopt practices conveyed through board networks because the information is 
trusted (Davis, 1991) and more up-to-date and timely than information received from 
secondary sources (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982).  
But the extent to which an organization adopts the normative practices of its 
institutional field depends on its position in the network (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). 
The more centrally the organization is located, the more access it has to information and 
resources in the network, and the stronger the pressure to conform to the social norms 
(Grannovetter, 1973; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Salman & Saives, 2005). Organizations 
that operate at the center of the network therefore find it difficult to deviate from 
normative practices (Freeman, 1978/79). In contrast, those that are located at the 
periphery of the network can challenge existing institutional norms (Clemens & Cook, 
1999) because these organizations are largely excluded from the network (Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001) and face weaker institutional pressures. Since they are less embedded 
in the network, peripheral organizations are therefore more often exposed to alternative 
practices (Weimann, 1982).  
In the context of environmental issues, organizations on the periphery of the 
network can deviate positively because they exist in more distant and less restrictive 
institutional setting (Clemens & Cook, 1999) and are enabled by outside groups within 
that space to oppose the dominant institutional logics (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). For 
example, many special interest groups such as non-government organizations, activist 
shareholders, consumers, and others, encourage organizations to adopt above-and-beyond 
environmental practices, and the adoption of these practices are voluntary rather than 
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legally mandated. Targets of these actions are typically identified as organizations that 
develop practices and positions on environmental issues that are peripheral to mainstream 
behaviors. In short, positive organizational deviance for environmental practices is more 
likely to occur in firms that are on the periphery of the network than those that are central. 
Therefore, the more centrally located an organization is in the network, the less likely that 
it will deviate positively in its environmental actions. 
H1: An organization’s network centrality is negatively associated with positive 
environmental deviance. 
 
Intra-Organizational Factors: Board Experience 
The human capital that board directors provide in the form of knowledge, skills 
and experiences is beneficial for organizations (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
Increasingly, boards play an active role in formulating organizational strategy and 
disseminating information and advice to managers (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Since 
information that enters the firm via this network is screened and filtered by board 
members (Salman & Saives, 2005) and subject to processes that lead to bounded 
rationality, it is important to consider how characteristics of these directors could impact 
the organizational interpretation and response to institutional pressures.  
Past experience is a key cognitive filter through which information is processed 
and understood (Hambrick, 2007; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Walsh, 1988). Past 
experience can come in the form of occupational backgrounds (Golden & Zajac, 2001; 
Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008; Stearn & Mizruchi, 1993; Westphal & Frederickson, 
2001), for instance, or appointments on other boards (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). In 
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contrast, when information or knowledge is outside the board’s expertise, it can hinder 
problem solving and the ability to consider alternative approaches (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987; Ocasio, 1997). Thus, past experience is an important characteristic that helps 
directors to determine what specific issues to attend to in the boardroom (Tuggle, 
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2010).  
From an institutional perspective, specialized and innovative knowledge and 
background experience among key members allows organizations to break away from 
established field norms (Battilana, 2006; Sewell, 1992). The skills and experiences of 
organizational actors such as board directors allow organizations to deviate in their 
response, even when institutional settings are commonly shared among multiple 
organizations (Colomy, 1998). When the past experience of numerous board members is 
similar and abundant, information can be processed more efficiently because knowledge 
structures are more developed (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Day & Lord, 1992; 
Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, the greater the collective experience of board members in 
dealing with environmental sustainability issues, the more robust their decision making 
process regarding such practices will be. An organization that has a high level of 
environmental experience on its board is able to deviate positively from the dominant 
institutional norms.  
H2: The amount of environmental experience of an organization’s board of 
directors is positively associated with positive environmental deviance. 
 
Interaction Effect of Board Networks and Experience 
While agency and enactment occur when key members of the organization 
interpret external information in a specific manner, the organization remains subject to 
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the constraints of its institutional environment, especially the normative influences of 
inter-organizational networks. This points to a tension between structural elements and 
intra-organizational factors. On the one hand, networks create pressure on organizations 
to conform to institutional norms. On the other hand, board directors with extensive 
environmental experience place pressure on the organization to deviate positively from 
such norms. An interaction effect between board networks and board experience 
therefore exists.  
While the organization may be better able to deviate positively in their response 
when they are far from the center of the network, this type of organizational action still 
requires human agency. Therefore, the combination of network position with background 
experience of board directors is a powerful predictor of positive organizational deviance 
(Battilana, 2006; Sewell, 1992). We propose that this interaction is important. On the one 
hand, organizations are more likely to deviate when they are less centrally placed in the 
network. However, an organization that has extensive environmental experience is also 
able to challenge institutional norms, even when a firm is very central in the network.  
H3: Environmental experience positively moderates the relationship between 
network centrality and positive environmental deviance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Our sample consisted of an unbalanced panel data set of 294 U.S. listed firms 
from 2000-2008 resulting in a total of 1,881 firm-year observations. The average firm 
panel was 6.4 years. The sample was restricted to organizations in the S&P500 index 
from primary and manufacturing industries as they are most affected by environmental 
issues (Hart & Ahuja, 1996). The data covered 31 different industries by 2-digit SIC 
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code; the largest representatives were food (8.2% of firms), chemicals (14.0%), industrial 
machinery (7.8%), electronics (10.4%), instruments (9.5%) and utility (12.7%) industries. 
Dependent Variable 
We measured “positive environmental deviance” in terms of corporate 
environmental practices that go above-and-beyond the minimal normative expectations 
that offer broad social benefits and deviate from others within the institutional field 
(Baron, 2006; Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004). We used data 
from Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) to capture such activities that mitigate the 
organization’s impact on the natural environment through products, processes and 
policies (Bansal & Roth, 2000). KLD’s data is used extensively in academic research and 
is considered the standard for environmental and social performance (Chen & Delmas, 
2010; Waddock, 2003). In particular, the KLD “environmental strengths” data consists of 
six categories that capture environmental practices of a positive nature in the sense that 
they go beyond minimal compliance requirements and offer broad social benefits. The 
categories include: products and services that promote efficient use of energy or have 
environmental benefits, pollution prevention programs that reduce emissions and toxic 
use, using recycled materials in the manufacturing process, use of alternative fuels such 
as natural gas, wind and solar energy or a commitment to energy efficiency programs, 
adopting environmental reporting or similar environmental communication practices and 
other strong environmental attributes not capture in prior categories. These categories 
were summed to provide each organization with a total “positive environmental practice” 
score from 2001 to 2008 (given the one year lead of the dependent variable). In our 
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sample, the highest environmental practice score was four (out of a possible six) by firms 
in lumber and wood, chemicals, industrial machinery and instruments industries. 
Next, we assessed whether organizations deviated in this score from others in the 
broader institutional field to measure positive environmental deviance. Institutional 
theorists often study inter-organizational fields in the context of industries; examples are 
institutional field studies in the radio (Leblebici et al, 1991), biotechnology (Zucker & 
Darby, 1996), thrift (Haveman & Rao, 1997), chemicals (Hoffman, 1999), finance 
(Lounsbury, 2002), recycling (Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch, 2003), sports 
(Washington, 2004), photography (Munir, 2005), and wine (Marshall, Cordano & 
Silverman, 2005). We therefore operationalized an organization’s institutional field based 
on its industry by 2-digit SIC code. We calculated positive environmental deviance by 
subtracting the mean score of the industry from the organization’s positive environmental 
practice score. For example, if a firm’s positive environmental practice score was 3.00 
and the industry’s mean score was 1.71, then the organization would have a positive 
environmental deviance score of 1.29. On the other hand, if the firm’s score was 1.00 and 
the industry’s mean score was 1.32, the organizational positive environmental deviance 
score would be below average at -0.32.  
Independent Variables 
We lagged independent variables by one year, to allow for changes in 
environmental practices to take place based on the organizational characteristics in the 
previous year. Data on board members was aggregated to the level of the firm, making an 
implicit assumption that the “environmental experience” construct is a collective 
phenomenon of individual-level board data (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). We assumed that 
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our data are configurational and also pooled, but unconstrained (Klein & Kozlowski, 
2000). That is, we had no a priori expectation that experiences of directors automatically 
converge. Although there are significant differences among board members in regards to 
their environmental experiences, the contribution of one individual can have a substantial 
impact on organizational practices (Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, we aggregated the 
individual board data linearly at firm level by taking a sum (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). 
Data on board directors came from BoardEx (Management Diagnostics Limited). 
The database tracks historical information dating back to the year 2000 on board directors 
of public and private corporations worldwide. The data contains biographical information 
on individuals who sit on boards, such as their age, gender, nationality, employment 
history, current and past board positions, educational background, professional 
achievements, and so on. We used this data to operationalize two key independent 
variables for each firm from 2000-2007 (given the one year lag of independent variables): 
network centrality and environmental experience. 
Our purpose for using network effects was to capture influencing social factors of 
attitudes about environmental strategies. These social influences can be transferred to 
many recipients in the network at the same time (Borgatti, 2005). Specifically, we 
captured this process via firms’ ties to other firms through interlocking directorships of 
its board members. This way, we were able to calculate the degree centrality and 
eigenvector centrality of a firm.  Degree centrality is the number of ties or paths that 
emanate from one node (Borgatti, 2005) and it defines how much the firm serves as a 
channel of information (Freeman, 1978/79), capturing short-term influencing effects 
(Borgatti, 2005). Eigenvector centrality is the score of a node by the score of adjacent 
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notes (Borgatti, 2005). Eigenvector centrality is a measure of friends-of-friends 
influences (Scott & Davis, 2007) by looking at ties that are one step removed from the 
focal firm and captures longer-term influences in the social network (Borgatti, 2005). 
Using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) we calculated normalized degree 
and eigenvector centrality, by year, for each firm. The scores were then centered for the 
purpose of calculating interaction effects (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Environmental experience was calculated using BoardEx data on directors’ past 
employment history, board and other positions held, awards and honors received, and 
other activities. We coded any information that was relevant to environmental experience, 
following a system of key words similar to that used in other studies assessing 
environmental information of boards (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). First, we searched 
for key environmental words in the role description of prior positions directors held. Key 
words include “environment”, “ecology”, “nature”, “sustainable”, “remediation”, 
“renewable”, “pollution” and “energy”. We also searched for variations of these words, 
for example “ecological” was a variation of “ecology”. We then checked the context of 
role descriptions that were tagged for misrepresentation. For instance, we eliminated all 
“energy” positions that were not indicative of jobs related to environmental sustainability 
such as roles in “energy transmission”, “energy delivery”, “energy systems engineer”, or 
“energy production”, etc. Similarly, we eliminated positions to do with “natural gas” that 
were tagged by searching for “natural”. By director and year, we calculated the number 
of years of work experience in environmental-related roles1. Second, we coded awards 
                                                        
1 About 30% of roles tagged for “environmental experience” were missing either a start date or end date, or 
both. We assigned 1 year of experience to these roles to ensure that environmental experience was 
minimally represented for that director. Thus, our final calculations are likely a conservative account of the 
actual amount of environmental experience.  
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and honors directors received using the same key word searches to calculate the total 
number of environmental awards a director had received. Third, we coded directors’ 
membership, advisory or management role of environmental activities in local 
community events, foundations, and institutions such as non-government organizations. 
We calculated the total number of environmental activities in which a director was 
involved. Fourth, we used the information on director’s historical board positions to 
identify if directors had been members of a board’s sub-committee with environmental 
goals. Dedicated environmental committees not only encourage directors to be extra 
vigilant (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002) but sub-committees are also a source of building 
domain-specific knowledge (Kriger, 1998; Leksell & Lindgren, 1982). Moreover, the 
influence of individual directors to transfer knowledge may be stronger when directors sit 
on relevant sub-committees (Shropshire, 2010). We calculated the number of years of 
experience directors had on environmental sub-committees. The final environmental 
experience measure was then aggregated to firm-level, for each year of data, by summing 
all four types of environmental experience. 
Various organizational control variables were added to account for firm-specific 
factors that could affect environmental practices (King & Lenox, 2002): firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q), firm size (number of employees), sales growth (change of sales 
over the previous year), capital expenditure (logged), leverage (debt/assets), and R&D 
intensity (R&D expenses/sales). We also included advertising intensity (advertising 
expenses/sales) since prior work has shown its influence on corporate social 
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responsibility outcomes (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000)2. We further added board controls, 
at firm-level, that could affect board group dynamics and subsequent decisions made over 
environmental practices. We controlled for board size since larger boards tend to have 
more network ties (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994) and be less effective at decision 
making and monitoring (Dalton et al, 1999; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). We also accounted 
for CEO duality since such powerful CEOs potentially influence board decisions, 
although this was not found to be relevant to environmental practices in prior studies 
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; McKendall, Sanchez & Sicilian, 1999; Post, Rahman & 
Rubow, 2010). We added board independence, measured as the proportion of outside 
directors, since more independent boards tend to be more concerned with proactive 
environmental practices (Post et al, 2011). We further controlled for mean board tenure 
since boards with longer tenures tend to be more dedicated to standard company practices, 
rely more heavily on traditions and tend to conform towards values of the leaders (c.f. 
Kosnik, 1991). Finally, we added year dummies to control for annual differences in 
environmental practices such as regulations coming into place or economic downturns. 
Estimation Techniques 
The purpose of our study was to assess main and interaction effects of board 
characteristics and network effects on positive environmental deviance. Since our 
dependent variable was a continuous and normally distributed measure, we used least 
square techniques for estimation for panel data. A Hausman test indicated that fixed 
effects models were more appropriate (Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984). This technique 
accounts for firm-fixed effects and we therefore did not control for industry differences 
                                                        
2 R&D and advertising expenses were missing for many firms. Since such figures are typically disclosed 
when material, we assumed these expenses were zero if data were missing, and checked the robustness of 
these results using dummies for missing observations. Results were consistent across all models. 
 21 
as the model captured these. We conducted several robustness tests to account for the 
possibility of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation by using robust standard errors and 
dynamic models that included lags of the dependent variable in the equation. Models that 
corrected for these issues showed similar results, indicating that our analyses were robust. 
To interpret and plot the interaction effects, we centered the relevant variables (degree 
centrality, eigenvector centrality, and environmental experience) prior to including them 
in the regression (Aiken & West, 1991).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides an overview of our descriptive statistics. Firm size correlates 
moderately with capital expenditure and both measures of centrality. In addition, capital 
expenditure correlates moderately with board size and the centrality measures, and board 
size correlates moderately with centrality. Larger boards also correlate with more 
environmental experience. These correlations were anticipated since larger firms tend to 
have more capital, larger boards and larger networks.  
Positive environmental deviance ranged from -1.50 to 3.17, with a mean score of 
0.01. Roughly one third of firms had a score above zero, and about eight percent of firms 
scored higher than one. Thus, we were confident that higher positive environmental 
deviance was indeed a stronger above-and-beyond practice than the field’s (industry) 
norm. In general, firms in all industries followed this overall pattern3. 
                                                        
3 Exceptions were the publishing/printing and the railroad industries. In these industries, one firm 
deviated highly positively compared to the rest of the firms.  
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Environmental experience of boards ranged from 0-85, and represented a sum of 
the number of environmental activities (0-21), number of awards (0-5), years of job 
experience (0-29) and years of serving on dedicated board committees (0-67).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
We ran our regressions in stages (Table 2). Model 1 represents the base model 
with only control variables and shows that capital expenditure and board size are 
significantly negatively associated with positive environmental deviance. Year dummies 
were not statistically significant in most models, except for the year 2000. 
Subsequent models include the direct and interaction effects of the variables of 
interest. Model 2 shows that degree centrality is negatively associated with positive 
environmental deviance. This indicates support for Hypothesis 1 that more central firms 
in the network are less likely to deviate positively from norm environmental practices in 
the institutional field. In contrast, environmental experience was positively and 
significantly associated with positive environmental deviance, in support of Hypothesis 2. 
This suggests that boards with environmental experience are more likely to engage in 
beyond-compliance environmental practices. These centrality and experience effects are 
replicated in Model 4 when eigenvector centrality is used. In both cases, the models 
increase in variance explained over the base model from 2.2% to 7.3% in Model 2 and 
6.4% in Model 4. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
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Models 3 and 5 show that the interaction effect between centrality and 
environmental experience is positive and statistically significant, in support of 
Hypothesis 3. The interaction effect explains additional variance, increasing the R-square 
to 7.5% in Model 3 and 7.0% in Model 5. We plotted the interaction effects of both 
degree and eigenvector centrality with environmental experience (Figures 1 and 2) using 
one standard deviation from the mean for “low” and “high” values of centrality and 
experience. The plots show that firms who are more highly centralized, whether captured 
as an immediate or long-term social network effect, deviate less positively than firms on 
the periphery of the network. However, when boards have increased environmental 
experience the firm has a higher level of positive deviation than when environmental 
experience is low, even when network centrality is high. In contrast, firms with low 
environmental experience on their boards have much lower positive environmental 
deviance in the context of high degree and eigenvector centrality. A test of the simple 
slopes (Aiken & West, 1991) confirms these results. Thus, our results find support for all 
three hypotheses. 
-------------------------------------- 




This work explored the extent to which the board of directors, as a boundary 
spanning and central governance function of the organization, acts as an agentic body to 
resist institutional pressures that lead to organizational conformity. We found that the 
past environmental experience of the board plays a critical role in allowing organizations 
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to deviate positively in their environmental practices, whereas the centrality of an 
organization’s location in the institutional network, through the interlocking directorships 
of its board members, increases conformity. Yet, even when network pressures to 
conform were strong, a board with high experience could incite a company to deviate 
positively from its peers. This behavioral role of the board appears to be critical in 
understanding corporate environmental behavior, while many structural elements of 
boards, such as CEO duality, board independence, and board tenure, were not found to be 
significant in our work. Thus, while organizational behavior is certainly affected by the 
institutional environment (Bansal & Penner, 2002), the framing, interpretation, attention, 
and sensemaking of issues within organizational bodies (Dutton & Duckerich, 1991; 
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002; Scott, 1995) matters significantly.  
Our findings support previous theoretical work that discusses the importance of 
the board’s mediating role for corporate governance and environmental performance that 
goes beyond a strictly principal-agency relationship (Lan & Heracleous, 2010; Walls et al, 
2012). By adopting a behavioral governance lens, we were able to determine that past 
experience and networks of boards are important socio-psychological considerations in  
capturing the real-world corporate governance complexities (Hambrick et al, 2008; 
Lubatkin, 2007). In recognizing that cognitive influences affect organizational 
interpretations of field pressures, our findings provide deeper insights into heterogeneous 
organizational responses in similar institutional contexts (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Milstein et al, 2002).  
Understanding how organizations become “more sustainable” has important 
theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, we add to research in environmental 
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management (Ehrenfeld, 2008; Hart, 1995) and positive organizational scholarship 
(Hoffman et al, 2011). Practically, our work provides insight into why some 
organizations adopt above-and-beyond environmental practices and others do not, even 
when most organizations now have designed board committees to oversee strategic and 
advanced sustainability initiatives. Our paper offers some clues as to when such actions 
are substantive rather than symbolic: appointing directors that have environmental 
experience is necessary if firms truly wish to deviate positively from normative 
environmental standards and critical if the organization is deeply embedded in the 
network field. More generally, as recent social movements such as Occupy Wall Street 
have elevated social responsibility and “good” corporate governance in the corporate 
agenda, our work points out that the composite experience of the elite group of people 
who sit on boards can decide the organization’s accountability and posture on social and 
environmental issues.   
 We acknowledge that our work has several limitations. Our study analyzes large, 
U.S. firms in “dirty” industries. Extrapolation of the results to small and medium sized 
enterprises, service industries, and firms in other institutional settings may not be 
meaningful. A second limitation is that we did not measure group dynamics of boards. 
We made an explicit assumption that the individual experiences of board members would 
have a cumulative effect at the organizational level (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; 
Shropshire, 2010) and that boards would collectively interpret information from the 
external environment and make decisions jointly. Inter-personal dynamics must certainly 
be accounted in future studies. Third, our data did not lend itself to analyzing underlying 
micro-processes of interpretation, or sensemaking of individuals and/or organizational 
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groups (Daft & Weick, 1984; Maitlis, 2005; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Weick, 1979; 
1995). While we can say something about how the collective environmental experience 
of the board of directors is associated with organizational environmental deviance, we 
stop short of investigating more refined interactions between micro- and macro-level 
processes.  
Future research could further explore the role of board experience, not only by 
developing a cognitive understanding of the organization’s internal and external 
environments (sensemaking), but also through “sensegiving” by disseminating that re-
interpreted institutional environment to stakeholders and influencing organizational 
action (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Prior research has established that the role of 
directors is important in sensegiving activities such as raising issues, questioning 
assumptions, testing ideas, advising caution, and offering encouragement (McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999). In the context of environmental sustainability, the level of ecological 
expertise crucially determines noticing, bracketing, understanding and acting on complex 
ecological processes that cross space and time (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011) such as 
climate change or ecosystem destruction. Our work focused on the experience of board 
directors, but the ecological embedded knowledge of other organizational bodies such as 
senior management, functions responsible for supply chain relations or operational 
management might also aid organizations to deviate positively in their actions.  
Our work is but a first step towards furthering the field of behavioral governance. 
Hambrick and colleagues (2008) suggest many avenues of research in this direction that 
are well beyond the scope of our work. For instance, it would be interesting to consider 
the interactions of a director’s experience and his or her influence or power over the 
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board and top management team. In other words, can one individual with enough 
experience and power sway the entire organization into a particular direction? And what 
other moderating or mediating effects exist? Recent work suggests that even the context 
of the board meetings could play an important role in how much attention is paid to 
particular issues (Tuggle et al, 2010).  
Other board characteristics, such as members’ attitudes towards the environment, 
may also be relevant. These could be measured via survey-techniques using 
environmental attitude scales such as the “New Ecological Paradigm” (e.g. Dunlap et al, 
2000) or underlying values orientations (e.g. Stern, Dietz & Kalof, 1993). We suspect 
that firms whose boards have stronger pro-environmental attitudes would be more likely 
to deviate positively in terms of environmental practices, and that the centrality and 
interaction effects would behave similarly as our findings for environmental experience.  
Finally, this paper focuses on positive organizational deviance because we were 
interested in understanding the intra-organizational and contextual factors that enable 
companies to “do well by doing good”. But it may be equally interesting to assess what 
spurs companies to behave environmentally “worse” than others. Deviance can be both 
negative and positive and there is no reason to assume that the mechanisms in one 
domain will also be present in the converse domain. We believe that a behavioral 
governance perspective could be equally relevant for explaining negative organizational 
deviance, in that board directors with certain types of experience might interpret 
information differently and rationalize such organizational behavior, beyond what 




The institutional literature has often been criticized for being under-socialized; 
paying insufficient attention to the role of agency (or deviance) and the role of filtering 
processes among organizational decision-makers. This study seeks to bring people back 
in (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997), offering an explanation for positive deviance from 
institutional norms that is driven by powerful members of the organization, those that 
reside within leadership roles in the board of directors. These members, and the networks 
of which they are part, determine which institutional norms are attended to, interpreted 
and acted upon. In this way, institutional norms, at times seen as creating isomorphism, 
can in fact be interpreted in different ways by different constituents across the field. By 
ignoring the role that organizational bodies play in this interpretation process and the 
distinct aspects by which they play them, we fail to recognize the determinants of 
positive deviants in any community. These deviants are often the source of innovation, 
energy and change within institutional fields. 
This insight is particularly important for those that study institutional change 
around environmental sustainability. Corporations are the most powerful entities in 
today’s market, political and social environments. Solutions to contemporary 
environmental issues (e.g. climate change, water scarcity, species extinction, ecosystem 
destruction) can only be found and implemented through the actions of those within the 
corporate sector. Seeking strictly policy approaches for stimulating pro-environmental 
behavior within this population of organizations focuses attention on the lowest common 
denominator for establishing standards for motivating positive deviance. This paper 
draws attention to the behavior of more innovative organizations – those that seek to go 
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beyond such institutionalized policy pressures to engage in new practices that meet 
today’s pressing environmental problems. Indeed, the actions of these kinds of positive 
deviants is arguably the only way we will make advances in environmental sustainability, 
moving away from incremental approaches for being “less unsustainable” and towards 
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Table 1: Correlations 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Positive Env’tal Deviance 0.01 0.74             
2 Tobin's Q 1.49 1.52 -0.07            
3 Firm Size 36.79 46.65 0.21 -0.03           
4 Sales Growth 10.84 28.65 -0.05 0.19 -0.05          
5 Capital Expenditure 5.94 1.38 0.27 -0.15 0.45 0.01         
6 Leverage 0.27 0.14 -0.04 -0.31 -0.10 -0.03 0.06        
7 Board Size 11.03 2.31 0.18 -0.10 0.34 -0.04 0.42 0.09       
8 CEO duality 0.74 0.44 0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02      
9 Board Independence 0.85 0.08 0.05 -0.18 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.10     
10 Board Tenure 7.80 3.34 0.08 0.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20    
11 Degree Cent 0.00 0.93 0.26 -0.01 0.47 -0.10 0.39 0.01 0.46 0.17 0.15 -0.04   
12 Eigenvector Cent 0.00 4.94 0.28 0.03 0.49 -0.07 0.41 -0.02 0.40 0.14 0.12 -0.04 0.92  
13 Environmental Experience 0.00 13.09 0.25 -0.14 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.37 0.09 0.23 -0.06 0.37 0.40 
n = 1,881 
Correlations of 0.04 and above are significant at p<0.05  
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression Models for Positive Environmental Deviance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Tobin's Q -0.015 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019 -0.016 
 (s.e.) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.002 0.002† 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Expenditure -0.115** -0.117** -0.111** -0.118** -0.109** 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Leverage -0.286† -0.196 -0.206 -0.185 -0.190 
  (0.167) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) 
Year Dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Board Size -0.022* -0.018† -0.017† -0.026** -0.023* 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO duality 0.032 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.018 
  (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Board Independence 0.207 0.235 0.246 0.210 0.235 
  (0.258) (0.252) (0.252) (0.253) (0.252) 
Board Tenure 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Degree Centrality  -0.143** -0.145**   
   (0.031) (0.031)   
Environmental Experience  0.016** 0.015**   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Degree*Experience   0.003*   
    (0.002)   
Eigenvector Centrality    -0.015* -0.020** 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
Environmental Experience    0.017** 0.014** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Eigenvector*Experience     0.001** 
      (0.000) 
Constant 0.815* 0.725* 0.674* 0.852** 0.753* 
  (0.317) (0.313) (0.313) (0.313) (0.313) 
R-Square 0.022 0.073 0.075 0.064 0.070 
n = 1,881 
Two-tailed t-tests:  † p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01 
 
 
